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HEWITT v. SHIPLEY
pany's financing of the Poole Engineering Company. The
District Court's charge to the jury and the opinion denying
a motion for new trial took an opposite view of the law of
the situation from that of the Court of Appeals of Maryland
in the instant case. There was an appeal taken therein
from the judgment rendered for the plaintiff, but the case
was settled before it was argued on appeal.

THE EFFECT OF A SEPARATION AGREEMENT
UPON THE SURVIVING SPOUSE'S
RIGHT TO ADMINISTER
Hewitt v. Shipley'
Husband filed a petition in the Orphans' Court of Baltimore City claiming that he had received no notice before
letters of administration were granted his brother-in-law,
and that he, as surviving spouse, was legally entitled to
administer and share in the estate of his deceased wife. The
answer denied the right of the husband to notice of the
granting of letters because the husband had surrendered all
his rights in the estate of the deceased wife by virtue of an
agreement of separation between him and her. The pertinent provisions of that separation agreement provided that
the husband pay the wife a named sum of money and the
costs of a pending divorce proceeding and relinquish claim
on certain named property as a fair and just provision for
her; that the settlement be in lieu of all the property rights
of the wife against the husband whether vested, inchoate or
anticipated as wife, widow, heir, or next of kin; that "all
the property of the wife, both real and personal, now held
by her or which shall hereafter come to her, shall be and
remain her sole and separate property, free from all the
rights of the husband, with full power to her to convey, assign, or deal with the same as if she were single ;" and that
he would sign the necessary papers. From an order
granting the petition, the administrator appealed. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the order. Held: A separation
agreement will not be construed to bar the right of a surviving spouse in the estate of the other, unless it is clearly
expressed therein, or necessarily implied therefrom. Therefore the grant of letters to another was improper in this
case where there was no express bar and none was necessarily implied.
1169 Md. 221, 181 At]. 84

(iI).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The Court of Appeals cited as authority for the holding
of the instant case a number of earlier Maryland decisions
where marriage settlements were held not to bar a husband's rights in the estate of his deceased wife unless the
settlement so provided.' The only square decision of the
Court of Appeals cited as authority was the case of Willis v.
Jones' which held that a written agreement in contemplation
of divorce, containing no evidence of an intent on the part
of the husband to abandon his rights in his wife's property
if there should be no divorce, was not a bar to his right to
administer or share in the estate of his deceased wife.
Under the statute4 letters of administration are to be
granted by the Court at its discretion either to the surviving
spouse or one of the children; and, if there be no child,5 the
surviving spouse is preferred and entitled to notice of the
grant of letters before being excluded from the administration.' The same preference is accorded surviving spouses
as heirs in the distribution of deceased spouses' estates.7 It
is evident that our testamentary system has aimed to commit administration to the hands of those most interested in
the estate.' The instant case answers the question as to the
significance of a separation agreement under this policy.
By a separation agreement substantially the results of a
divorce a mensa et thoro are attained by the parties without
a judicial determination. The marriage is not dissolved,
the husband continues to support the wife, and rights in
property are not changed except as provided by the agreement or by the decree. Thus separation alone does not
change the status of a wife and it therefore does not of itself
deprive the wife of her share in her husband's personal
2 Townshend v. Matthews, 10 Md. 251 (1856) ; Hutchins, et al., v. Dixon,
Executor, 11 Md. 29 (1857) ; Moody v. Hall, 61 Md. 517 (1884). Incidentally the agreements there were found to affect the title to the property
beyond life and thus effectuate a bar.
'42 Md. 422 (1875).
'Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 18.
Md. Code, Art. 93, See. 19.
'Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 32.
7 Md. Code, Art. 93, Sees. 125, 126, 127.
' Dalrymple, Admr., et al., v. Gamble, 66 Md. 298, 7 Atl. 683, 8 At]. 468
(1886), where a widow who by an ante-nuptial agreement had no interest
in her hitsband's estate was held to have no right to administer. But see
Willis v. Jones, supra, note 3, where a surviving spouse was held entitled
to letters unless he had validly parted with his rights or been lawfully
deprived.
9 For general validity of separation agreements see Md. Code Supp., Art.
16, Sec. 39A, Acts of 1931, Ch. 220, and Harrison v. Harrison, 160 Md. 378,
153 Atl. 58 (1930); Myers v. Myers, 153 Md. 44, 137 Atl. 501 (1927);
McFrederick v. McFrederick, 160 Md. 91, 152 Atl. 818 (1930); Leary v.
Clayton, 181 Md. 545, 102 Atl. 765 (1917).
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estate or her right to administer." This principle has been
carried to the extreme point that, since an agreement of
separation does not dissolve the marital relations of the
parties, the wife is the widow of the deceased husband and
is, as such, technically entitled to preference in the right to
administer his estate regardless of the question as to her
right in the property. 1 But it must be remembered that the
right of the widow to administer depends on her right to
take of the personal estate and therefore the right to inherit
is necessarily involved in the application for letters. 2 So,
although the marital status is not altered by the agreement
of the parties, yet either may contract away his inheritable
interests in the other's estate and thereby lose the right to
administer. 8 There is ample authority holding that the
right of a spouse to share in or inherit from the estate of
the deceased spouse may be barred by a valid separation
agreement. 4 That right, however, should not be denied because of a separation agreement unless that purpose be
expressed or necessarily inferred from the agreement. 5
In Girard v. Girard" the wife for a consideration paid
by the husband "released all right, title, or interest of any
kind, whatsoever, in law or in equity, which she may now
have or possess in any and all property of any kind, now
owned or hereafter acquired by the husband in his lifetime."
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that where a separation agreement does not, by express terms or by necessary
implication, provide that she waives, releases, relinquishes,
and renounces her right to inherit from him upon his death,
intestate and without issue, such rights still remain with
and may be enforced by such surviving widow. Courts will
go no further than the language of the contract extends and
will not deprive either spouse of such rights unless there is
a clear and unmistakable intention to barter them away.
In Smith v. Smith' where the language of the separation
agreement gave to the husband the full dominion of his own
10 Nusz, et al., v. Grove, 27 Md. 391, 400 (1867) ; Mobley v. Mobley, 149
Md. 401, 408, 131 Atl. 770 (1926).
11 Read v. Howe, 13 Iowa 50 (1862).
"235 A. L. R. 1511 Annotation.
10 In re Davis' Estate, 106 Cal. 453, 39 Pac, 756 (1895) ; Jones v. Lamont,
118 Cal. 499, 50 Pac. 766 (1897) ; see Dalrymple, Admr., et al., v. Gamble.
66 Md. 298, 7 Atl. 683, 8 Atl. 468 (1886), where ante-nuptial agreement had
this effect.
1 See cases cited in 35 A. L. R. 1505 ff. Annotation; McCubbin v. Patterson, 16 Md. 179 (1860).
15 Willis v. Jones, supra, note 3; Girard, et al., v. Girard, 29 N. M. 189,
221 Pac. 801, 35 A. L. R. 1493 (1923), both cases cited and approved in the
principal case.
'e Supra, note 15.
1757 Ohio St. 27, 48 N. E. 28, 29 (1807).
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property, with power to dispose of it by will or otherwise
without the assent of the wife in her lifetime, the Supreme
Court of Ohio held the wife's rights under the intestacy
laws were not barred when the husband did not dispose of
his property. This case was cited along with Willis v.
Jones as authority in the Hewitt case.
It would appear then, from the cases, that in Maryland
the law is that a separation agreement as such does not bar
the right of a surviving spouse to share in or administer
the estate of a deceased spouse unless there is an express
release of such rights or an inference to that effect so strong
that a construction to the contrary would be unreasonable.
But, if the right of inheritance is expressly or by strong
implication bartered away by the spouse in the separation
agreement, the policy behind the statutes providing for
grant of letters of administration will also take away the
preference in administration of the decedent's estate.
In the separation agreement in the Hewitt case the
words used would seem expressly to bar the rights of the
wife in the husband's estate since it states the settlement to
be in lieu of all the property rights of the wife against the
husband, whether vested, inchoate, or anticipated, as wife,
widow, heir, or next of kin. But the agreement as to the
wife's property is merely that it should be "free from all
rights of the husband, with full power to her to convey, assign, or deal with the same as if she were single." It cannot
even be inferred from the statement that the husband waived
his right to inherit or to administer should the wife predecease him. If here the wife had survived the husband perhaps a different result would have been reached by virtue
of the terminology of the wife's waiver of property rights
growing out of the marriage. It is arguable, however, that
the husband's waiver of rights in his spouse's property is
substantially as broad as that of the wife in his, and therefore it is necessarily implied that the husband by separation
agreement bartered away the right to share in deceased
wife's estate and consequently the right to administer the
estate.

